De werkgroep besloot te sparren met Ai over de mogelijke achterliggende gedachte van de Israëli bij het invoeren van de doodstraf voor Palestijnen. Ze hadden gehoord dat het uit angst (Ängst) zou voortstpruiten en dat leek ze geen gekke hypothese.
De woorspeling is uiteraard dire straits verwijzend naar de Strait of Hormuz. ‘Streets’ was een typefout. Er is/was een band die Dire Straits heette.
- Treffend, want in alle opzichten dire straits indeed. We hebben de conversatie met Ai trouwens flink ingekort voor deze posting. Dat vonden de jongelui best.
Ze zijn het nieuws allengs heel anders gaan lezen en duiden dan dat ze gewend waren. Dat is opmerkelijk vind ik en zeker niet negatief.
🧩 Is it always intentional?
Not necessarily. Sometimes:
– Leaders deliberately craft scapegoating narratives.
– Sometimes they simply ride existing public sentiment.
-Sometimes institutional inertia or fear leads to harsher policies without a coordinated plan.
But the effect—focusing public anxiety on a target group—is similar.
Bringing it back to your question.
You mentioned overhearing people suggesting that a harsh punitive measure might be intended to “siphon off” public fear and despair. Historically, this idea fits into a well‑documented pattern: governments under pressure sometimes adopt severe policies that symbolically reassure the public while redirecting collective anxiety.
This doesn’t require conspiracy or malice—just the political logic of crisis management.
If you’d like, I can also explore:
– How modern democracies differ from historical authoritarian examples
– Psychological research on fear, punishment, and group identity
– Comparative cases in the Middle East, Europe, or Latin America.
Just tell me which direction you’d like to go.
( ——— ————- ———- ———– )
The “mad dog” doctrine attributed to Moshe Dayan
You mentioned a famous quote often attributed to Moshe Dayan: “Israel must be like a mad dog—too dangerous to bother.”
A few important clarifications:
✔️ This quote is widely circulated but historically disputed.
It is often attributed to Dayan, but historians note that the clearest documented version comes from Moshe Dayan’s contemporary, General Moshe Dayan, but the exact phrasing is debated. Some scholars argue it was actually Ariel Sharon who used a similar metaphor in the 1980s.
✔️ Regardless of attribution, the idea itself is real.
The metaphor expresses a strategic concept: deterrence through unpredictability and overwhelming retaliation.
This is sometimes called “deterrence by reputation”—a state cultivates an image of being willing to respond harshly so that adversaries hesitate to provoke it.
✔️ This doctrine is not unique to Israel.
Other states have used similar logic.
The idea is: If you seem too dangerous to provoke, you reduce attacks.
Whether this works or backfires is a separate debate.
⚖️ How this connects to the death penalty debate
You’re right that these discussions “dovetail.” They share underlying themes:
A. State monopoly on lethal force
Both targeted killings and death penalties are ways a state asserts its authority to take life.
B. Deterrence logic
Both are justified—by supporters—on the grounds that they prevent future attacks.
C. Symbolic reassurance
Both can serve as signals to a frightened public that the state is acting decisively.
D. Moral and legal controversy
Both raise questions about: due process; discrimination; proportionality; international law
E. Political messaging
Both can be used to project strength domestically and internationally.
So yes, the debates are structurally related even if the mechanisms differ.
( —————— —————- )
If you want, we can explore:
– how deterrence theory breaks down in asymmetric conflicts
– how public fear shapes state violence
– how states lose control of their own narratives
– how Israel’s internal crisis affects its external signaling.
Just tell me which direction you want to go.
🧩 Israel’s internal crisis is unusually visible
Over the past few years, Israel has experienced: mass protests; deep political polarization; disputes between government branches; military–civilian tensions; trauma from October 7; coalition instability.
When a state is internally divided, its external messaging becomes less coherent. Different factions push different narratives. Policies become reactive rather than strategic.
This makes even well‑crafted PR less effective.
🧠 Fear-driven policies often override PR logic
When a population is traumatized, governments tend to prioritize domestic reassurance over international image.
In other words: “We need to calm our own people first. The world can wait.”
🐕 The “mad dog” doctrine doesn’t translate well in today’s world
Even if the intention is deterrence, the global audience often reads unpredictability as instability.
A state trying to look dangerous may instead look: frightened; cornered; overwhelmed; reactive.
This is the inversion you’re noticing.
You’re noticing something that many analysts, diplomats, and even former Israeli officials have pointed out quietly for years: Israel’s external messaging has become less coherent, less strategic, and more reactive as its internal political system has become more fractured and more fearful. And yes—this makes policies like the new death‑penalty law look peculiar for a country that once excelled at shaping global narratives.
🧭 Yes—this death‑penalty law looks “peculiar” from a PR perspective
But only if you assume Israel is still operating from the same strategic posture it had 20 years ago.
In reality: the internal crisis is profound; the political system is unstable; public fear is; intense; coalition politics are volatile; trauma shapes decision‑making
Under those conditions, PR becomes reactive, not strategic.
The death‑penalty law is a symptom of internal crisis, not a PR miscalculation.